An Experimental Analysis of the Ultimatum Game: The Role of Competing Motivations
This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.
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- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
- Cameron, Lisa A, 1999.
"Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(1), pages 47-59, January.
- Lisa Cameron, 1995. "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia," Working Papers 724, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Kahneman, Daniel & Knetsch, Jack L & Thaler, Richard H, 1986. "Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S285-300, October.
- A. Roth & I. Er’ev, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Run," Levine's Working Paper Archive 387, David K. Levine.
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