Sector-based explanation of vertical integration in distribution systems; Evidence from France
Based on recent data concerning the French distribution networks in retail and services, this paper highlights several stylized facts relating to the sector-based differences in the organizational choices. Until now this issue has not been studied in the economical literature. This paper provides an analytical framework derived from the theory of contracts, and evidence for the French case.
|Date of creation:||23 Dec 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00654848|
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