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Sovereign Crises and Bank Financing: Evidence from the European Repo Market

Author

Listed:
  • Charles Boissel

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)

  • Frannois Derrien
  • Evren Ors

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • David Thesmar

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

How do crises affect Central clearing Counterparties (CCPs)? We focus on CCPs that clear and guarantee a large and safe segment of the repo market during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We start by developing a simple framework to infer CCP stress, which can be measured through the sensitivity of repo rates to sovereign CDS spreads. Such sensitivity jointly captures three effects: (1) the effectiveness of the haircut policy, (2) CCP member default risk (conditional on sovereign default) and (3) CCP default risk (conditional on both sovereign and CCP member default). The data show that, during the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, repo rates strongly respond to movements in sovereign risk, in particular for GIIPS countries, indicating significant CCP stress. Our model suggests that repo investors behaved as if the conditional probability of CCP default was very large.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles Boissel & Frannois Derrien & Evren Ors & David Thesmar, 2014. "Sovereign Crises and Bank Financing: Evidence from the European Repo Market," Working Papers hal-02002697, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02002697
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Arianna Miglietta & Cristina Picillo & Mario Pietrunti, 2015. "The impact of CCPs' margin policies on repo markets," BIS Working Papers 515, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Cassola, Nuno & Koulischer, François, 2019. "The collateral channel of open market operations," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 73-90.
    3. Hau, Harald & Lai, Sandy, 2016. "Asset allocation and monetary policy: Evidence from the eurozone," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 309-329.
    4. Luque, Jaime, 2022. "The repo channel of cross-border lending in the European sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 59(PA).
    5. William Arrata & Benoit Nguyen & Imene Rahmouni-Rousseau & Miklos Vari, 2018. "The Scarcity Effect of Quantitative Easing on Repo Rates: Evidence from the Euro Area," IMF Working Papers 2018/258, International Monetary Fund.
    6. W. Arrata & B. Nguyen & I. Rahmouni-Rousseau & M. Vari, 2017. "Eurosystem’s asset purchases and money market rates," Working papers 652, Banque de France.
    7. Arrata, William & Nguyen, Benoît & Rahmouni-Rousseau, Imène & Vari, Miklos, 2020. "The scarcity effect of QE on repo rates: Evidence from the euro area," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(3), pages 837-856.
    8. Daniela Gabor & Cornel Ban, 2016. "Banking on Bonds: The New Links Between States and Markets," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 617-635, May.
    9. Corradin, Stefano & Rodriguez-Moreno, Maria, 2016. "Violating the law of one price: the role of non-conventional monetary policy," Working Paper Series 1927, European Central Bank.
    10. Francesco Molteni, 2015. "Liquidity, Government Bonds and Sovereign Debt Crises," Working Papers 2015-32, CEPII research center.

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