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Some Non-Classical Approaches to the Branderburger-Keisler Paradox

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  • Can Baskent

    (SEMAGRAMME - Semantic Analysis of Natural Language - Inria Nancy - Grand Est - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - LORIA - NLPKD - Department of Natural Language Processing & Knowledge Discovery - LORIA - Laboratoire Lorrain de Recherche en Informatique et ses Applications - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in epis-temic game theory, the Brandenburger -Keisler paradox. We approach the paradox from two different perspectives: non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Baskent, 2014. "Some Non-Classical Approaches to the Branderburger-Keisler Paradox," Working Papers hal-01094784, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01094784
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inria.fr/hal-01094784
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Unknown, 2006. "UFW Contract: Montpelier Orchards Management Company," United Farm Workers (UFW) Contracts 236469, University of California, Davis, Changing Face.
    2. Heifetz, Aviad, 1996. "Non-well-founded-Type Spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 202-217, October.
    3. John C. Harsanyi, 1967. "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players, I-III Part I. The Basic Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(3), pages 159-182, November.
    4. Mariotti, Thomas & Meier, Martin & Piccione, Michele, 2005. "Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 303-324, April.
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    Keywords

    Epistemic Game Theory; Paraconsistency;

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