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When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics

Author

Listed:
  • Cornelia Woll

    (CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Alvaro Artigas

    (CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Business-government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or - less often - lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public-private interactions with examples from the U.S., the E.U., and Brazil.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01071209, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01071209
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01071209
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