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The evolution of regulatory relationships; regulatory institutions and firm behaviour in privatized industries

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Willman
  • David Coen
  • David Currie
  • Martin Siner

Abstract

The radical changes instituted in the regulation of privatized public utilities in the UK in the 1980s and early 1990s have been the subject of extensive discussion, and have been partly instrumental in the development of 'regulatory economics' more widely. In this paper we argue that the conventional economics of regulation, based on principal-agent and related perspectives, treat the issue too narrowly and statically. Drawing on organizational sociology and cooperative game theory, we contend that it is essential to understand the process by which the interaction between the regulator and the regulated firms evolves. Using interview and documentary data, the paper describes the evolution of this relationship in three sectors in the UK. The growth of cooperative informal relationships between regulators and regulatory functions within firms involves the emergence and development of 'regulatory expertise'. This generates advantages for both sides, which are examined in terms of different regulatory games involving different levels of trust. The implications both for institutional design and for the economic theory of regulation are assessed. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Willman & David Coen & David Currie & Martin Siner, 2003. "The evolution of regulatory relationships; regulatory institutions and firm behaviour in privatized industries," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(1), pages 69-89, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:indcch:v:12:y:2003:i:1:p:69-89
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. James A. C. Ryan & Matthew C. Ives & Ian M. Dunham, 2019. "The impact of cost of capital reductions on regulated water utilities in England and Wales: an analysis of isomorphism and stakeholder outcomes," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(1), pages 259-287, March.
    2. David Coen, 2005. "Managing the Political Life Cycle of Regulation in the UK and German Telecommunication Sectors," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(1), pages 59-84, March.
    3. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Stefan Kentrup & Andreas Hoffjan & Maik Lachmann, 2013. "Wie betreiben Unternehmen Lobbying? Eine empirische Analyse der Einflussfaktoren, Ausgestaltungsformen und Strategien," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 342-371, June.
    5. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01071209, HAL.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 121-138, June.
    8. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8526, Sciences Po.
    9. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," Post-Print hal-01071209, HAL.
    10. Arnold Picot, 2009. "„Neue Spielregeln für Kapitalmärkte und Netzindustrien: Ökonomie der Regulierung”," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(6), pages 654-678, September.
    11. Chok, Jay Inghwee, 2009. "Regulatory dependence and Scientific Advisory Boards," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 710-725, June.
    12. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Shittu, Ekundayo & Kamdem, Bruno G. & Weigelt, Carmen, 2019. "Heterogeneities in energy technological learning: Evidence from the U.S. electricity industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1034-1049.

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