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Linking market capitalisation and voting pattern in corporate meetings

Author

Listed:
  • Juan Pineiro-Chousa

    (USC - Universidade de Santiago de Compostela [Spain])

  • Marcos Vizcaíno-González

    (Universidade da Coruña)

  • Jérôme Caby

    (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)

Abstract

This research seeks to investigate the connection between market capitalisation and the voting pattern related to proposals about executive compensation and directors' election, using data about banks from the U.S.A. concerning the 2003-2013 period. Our findings indicate that there is a direct relationship between voting pattern and market capitalisation, suggesting that they are mutually interdependent. When the market value of the bank increases (decreases), the support given by shareholders through their votes in meetings increases (decreases) as well. Also, when the approval showed by shareholders to managerial proposals through their voting decisions gets higher (lower), the market value of the bank gets higher (lower) too.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pineiro-Chousa & Marcos Vizcaíno-González & Jérôme Caby, 2018. "Linking market capitalisation and voting pattern in corporate meetings," Post-Print halshs-02001463, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02001463
    DOI: 10.1080/1331677x.2018.1432405
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02001463
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    References listed on IDEAS

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