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Pouvoir de marché, stratégies et régulation: Les contributions de Jean Tirole, Prix Nobel d'Economie 2014

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  • David Encaoua

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This article is devoted to a perspective of the works of Jean Tirole on the topics mentioned by the Nobel Committee, namely the analysis of market power, its control mechanisms and the regulation of network activities and natural monopoly. It develops in three parts. The first explains why and how these works have contributed to a profound renewal of the Industrial Organization field by offering strong theoretical foundations. The second presents different contributions that advance our understanding of the Economics of Innovation. The third part refers to the works on the Economics of Regulation. In each part, the focus is on three aspects: i / the state of knowledge at the time of the work, ii / the analytical instruments and iii / the lessons that can be drawn. The article seeks to illustrate a common feature in many of these works, that of combining theoretical research leading to the knowledge's enlargement in various fields of economic analysis, and a choice of questions motivated by a strong concern to find solutions to some contemporary economic problems, based on a serious prior theoretical analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • David Encaoua, 2015. "Pouvoir de marché, stratégies et régulation: Les contributions de Jean Tirole, Prix Nobel d'Economie 2014," Post-Print halshs-01148356, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01148356
    DOI: 10.3917/redp.251.0001
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01148356
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 522-530, Autumn.
    3. Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    patent pools; two-sided markets; O34 Key words: oligopoly; L51; L42; réseaux; incitations; asymétries informationnelles; standards technologiques; pools de brevets; marchés bifaces; systèmes non propriétaires; non-proprietary systems; vertical restraints; patent race; oligopole; restrictions verticales; forclusion; course au brevet; technological standards; asymmetric information; incentives; networks; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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