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Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Ian M. Mcdonald

    (Departement of Economics [Melbourne] - Faculty of Business and Economics [Melbourne] - University of Melbourne)

  • Nikos Nikiforakis

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Nilss Olekalns

    (Departement of Economics [Melbourne] - Faculty of Business and Economics [Melbourne] - University of Melbourne)

  • Hugh Sibly

    (School of Economics and Finance - UTAS - University of Tasmania [Hobart])

Abstract

We experimentally investigate reference group formation and the impact of social comparisons in a three-player ultimatum game. The players compete in a real-effort task for the role of the proposer. The role of the responder is randomly allocated to one of the other two participants. The third participant, the non-responder, receives a fixed payment our treatment variable - and makes no decision. Knowing the size of this payment, the proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-offer to the responder. Most responders appear to ignore the non-responder when the payment the latter receives is low, but not when it is high. As a result, the existence of a non-responder and the payment they receive has a pronounced effect on bargaining outcomes and increases overall rejection rates. We present a simple model in which agents select the members of their reference group strategically to reduce the extent of cognitive dissonance they experience. The model produces results consistent with our experimental findings

Suggested Citation

  • Ian M. Mcdonald & Nikos Nikiforakis & Nilss Olekalns & Hugh Sibly, 2013. "Social comparisons and reference group formation: Some experimental evidence," Post-Print halshs-00812002, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00812002
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.12.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Nikos Nikiforakis & Helen Mitchell, 2014. "Mixing the carrots with the sticks: third party punishment and reward," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. James Bland & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2013. "Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2013_19, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    3. Fongoni, Marco, 2024. "Does pay inequality affect worker effort? An assessment of experimental designs and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 697-716.
    4. Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2022. "Gender, Beliefs, and Coordination with Externalities Approach," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1330, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    5. Cristina Bicchieri & Eugen Dimant & Simon Gaechter & Daniele Nosenzo, 2020. "Observability, Social Proximity, and the Erosion of Norm Compliance," CESifo Working Paper Series 8212, CESifo.
    6. Blacklow, Paul & Sibly, Hugh & Corman, Amy Beth, 2021. "Do we prefer praise from acquaintances or strangers? An experiment on esteem seeking in one-shot versus repeated interactions," Working Papers 2021-08, University of Tasmania, Tasmanian School of Business and Economics.
    7. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2011. "Can real-effort investments inhibit the convergence of experimental markets?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 97-103, January.
    8. Lehr, Alex & Vyrastekova, Jana & Akkerman, Agnes & Torenvlied, René, 2016. "Spillovers and conflict in wage bargaining: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 59-68.
    9. Chiara Nardi, 2018. "Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 4(1), pages 91-106, March.
    10. Gächter, Simon & Gerhards, Leonie & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2017. "The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 72-86.
    11. Banuri, Sheheryar & Danková, Katarína & Keefer, Philip, 2024. "An experimental test of gaming incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 825-850.
    12. Benndorf, Volker & Rau, Holger A. & Sölch, Christian, 2018. "Minimizing learning behavior in repeated real-effort tasks," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 343, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    13. James Andreoni & Nikos Nikiforakis & Jan Stoop, 2021. "Higher socioeconomic status does not predict decreased prosocial behavior in a field experiment," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 12(1), pages 1-8, December.
    14. Agnès Festré, 2019. "On the Nature of Fair Behaviour: Further Evidence," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 193-207, December.
    15. Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Zhang, Jianlin, 2013. "The impact of social comparison of ability on pro-social behaviour," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 37-46.
    16. James Andreoni & Nikos Nikiforakis & Jan Stoop, 2017. "Are the Rich More Selfish than the Poor, or Do They Just Have More Money? A Natural Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 23229, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Bland, James & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2015. "Coordination with third-party externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-15.
    18. Klockmann, Victor & von Schenk, Alicia, 2023. "Patronizing behavior in heterogeneous teams: A laboratory experiment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    19. Amy K. Choy & John R. Hamman & Ronald R. King & Roberto A. Weber, 2016. "Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(1), pages 22-35, May.
    20. Loretta Mastroeni & Maurizio Naldi & Pierluigi Vellucci, 2023. "Personal Finance Decisions with Untruthful Advisors: An Agent-Based Model," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(4), pages 1477-1522, April.
    21. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Grossman, Philip J., 2022. "Gender, beliefs, and coordination with externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    22. Benndorf, Volker & Rau, Holger A. & Sölch, Christian, 2019. "Minimizing learning in repeated real-effort tasks," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 239-248.
    23. Rojas Valdes, Ruben I. & Lin Lawell, C.-Y. Cynthia & Taylor, J. Edward, "undated". "The Dynamic Migration Game: A Structural Econometric Model and Application to Rural Mexico," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 259184, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    24. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 44-61, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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