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L'encastrement social des pratiques de gestion : le cas de la relation d'emprunt pour les PME

  • Robert Paturel

    (ICI - Laboratoire Information, Coordination, Incitations - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - Télécom Bretagne - Institut des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - ISHS - Institut Mines-Télécom)

  • Stéphane Foliard

    ()

    (COACTIS - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne)

  • Mazen Gharsalli

    (ICI - Laboratoire Information, Coordination, Incitations - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBO - Université de Bretagne Occidentale - Télécom Bretagne - Institut des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - ISHS - Institut Mines-Télécom)

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    L'objectif de cet article est de proposer une nouvelle approche de la relation d'emprunt qui va au-delà de la définition marchande souvent retenue pour la mesurer. Il s'agit d'introduire les interactions sociales pour rendre compte de la confiance et de la transparence qu'elles peuvent générer. En ce sens, la théorie d'encastrement social (Granovetter, 1985) suggère que des transactions économiques " embedded " dans des liens sociaux ont des conséquences bénéfiques pour les firmes cherchant à combler leur besoin de financement (confiance, accès à l'information, meilleure gouvernance). En l'occurrence, la relation bancaire étant encastrée dans des liens sociaux suppose une relation de confiance personnalisée et durable. Elle implique un processus mutuel de compréhension susceptible d'instaurer un système de gouvernance spécifique à chaque cas (Portes et Sensenbrenner, 1993 ; DiMaggio et Louch, 1998). Cette gouvernance est basée sur un ensemble de " protocoles " acquis via les liens sociaux, qui sont susceptibles d'instaurer un " climat " de confiance mutuel où les deux parties cherchent à s'engager pour un intérêt commun, loin des comportements opportunistes (Uzzi, 1997). Les relations d'encastrement social paraissent donc comme une solution efficace aux problèmes d'agence et d'asymétrie d'information, longtemps non résolus par les relations marchandes.

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    Date of creation: 26 Oct 2010
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00765074
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00765074
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    1. Petersen, Mitchell A & Rajan, Raghuram G, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-43, May.
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    12. Jean-Louis Nakamura, 1999. "La relation banque – PME," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 54(4), pages 39-58.
    13. Erik Lehmann & Neuberger, Doris, 2000. "Do Lending Relationships Matter? Evidence from Bank Survey Data in Germany," CoFE Discussion Paper 00-04, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
    14. Brigitte Godbillon-Camus & Christophe J. Godlewski, 2005. "Gestion du Risque de Crédit dans la Banque : Information Hard, Information Soft et Manipulation," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2005-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
    15. Dorothée Rivaud-Danset & Robert Salais, 1992. "Les conventions de financement des entreprises. Premières approches théorique et empirique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 7(4), pages 81-120.
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