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Détresse Financière et restructurations des structures de Gouvernance : Une Analyse de Survie

  • Bradai Houda

    (ISG - Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis [Tunis] - Université de Tunis [Tunis])

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    In this study we empirically investigate the effect of financial distress on corporate governance of distressed firms. Our analysis is based on a panel of 42 American firms that suffered from repeated interest coverage shortfalls and steep earning per share declines between 1995 and 2005. We track each firm's development over the distress cycle with particular attention to corporate governance restructuring. Then, we test the role of this kind of restructuring in firm's survival using Cox regression. The results suggest differences of restructuration in different period of the distress cycle. In fact, if the size of the board of directors increases in the second year of distress, it decreases in the third year. Similar, the ownership of outsider directors, which increases in the second year then decrease in the third year. But, other kinds of corporate governance restructuring for improving independence of board of directors such as multiple reunions, separation of leadership structure and ownership of executives and directors are stable throughout the cycle distress. We find a significant increase in institutional ownership over three year of distress. Survival analysis results show a significant impact of the percentage of independent directors on the firm's survival. The managerial ownership has significant impact on the failure probability. Finally the turnover of the team of mangers can influence significantly the survival of distressed firms.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00522403.

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    Date of creation: May 2008
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    Publication status: Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom, 2008
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00522403
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