Détresse Financière et restructurations des structures de Gouvernance : Une Analyse de Survie
In this study we empirically investigate the effect of financial distress on corporate governance of distressed firms. Our analysis is based on a panel of 42 American firms that suffered from repeated interest coverage shortfalls and steep earning per share declines between 1995 and 2005. We track each firm's development over the distress cycle with particular attention to corporate governance restructuring. Then, we test the role of this kind of restructuring in firm's survival using Cox regression. The results suggest differences of restructuration in different period of the distress cycle. In fact, if the size of the board of directors increases in the second year of distress, it decreases in the third year. Similar, the ownership of outsider directors, which increases in the second year then decrease in the third year. But, other kinds of corporate governance restructuring for improving independence of board of directors such as multiple reunions, separation of leadership structure and ownership of executives and directors are stable throughout the cycle distress. We find a significant increase in institutional ownership over three year of distress. Survival analysis results show a significant impact of the percentage of independent directors on the firm's survival. The managerial ownership has significant impact on the failure probability. Finally the turnover of the team of mangers can influence significantly the survival of distressed firms.
|Date of creation:||May 2008|
|Publication status:||Published in LA COMPTABILITE, LE CONTRÔLE ET L'AUDIT ENTRE CHANGEMENT ET STABILITE, May 2008, France. pp.CD Rom, 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00522403|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barclay, Michael J. & Holderness, Clifford G., 1989. "Private benefits from control of public corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 371-395, December.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986.
"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Scholarly Articles 3606237, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
- Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
- Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
- Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
- Shumway, Tyler, 2001. "Forecasting Bankruptcy More Accurately: A Simple Hazard Model," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 101-124, January.
- Gilson, Stuart C., 1989. "Management turnover and financial distress," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 241-262, December.
- Bonnier, Karl-Adam & Bruner, Robert F., 1989. "An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 95-106, February.
- Gilson, Stuart C. & John, Kose & Lang, Larry H. P., 1990. "Troubled debt restructurings*1: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 315-353, October.
- Audretsch, David B & Mahmood, Talat, 1995. "New Firm Survival: New Results Using a Hazard Function," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(1), pages 97-103, February.
- Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, "undated". "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00522403. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.