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Large shareholder portfolios, monitoring and legal protection of shareholders : A note

Author

Listed:
  • Christian At

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure-Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Laurent Flochel

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure-Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We consider an optimal portfolio diversification model in which a large shareholder can influence shares return by monitoring efficiently managers. Less diversification decreases insurance but increases the stake in the ownership and then enhances efficiency of management monitoring. We analyze the effect of legal shareholders protection on portfolio diversification.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian At & Laurent Flochel, 2001. "Large shareholder portfolios, monitoring and legal protection of shareholders : A note," Post-Print halshs-00179976, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00179976
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00179976v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Denis Gromb & Fausto Panunzi, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728.
    2. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:1:p:65-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul & Zechner, Josef, 1994. "Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1097-1130, December.
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