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Optimum intérieur et financement efficient d'un bien public :une expérience

  • Matthieu Neveu

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)

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    Cette expérience sur les mécanismes de contribution volontaire à un bien public utilise une fonction de paiement qui définit l'optimum de Pareto à l'intérieur de l'espace stratégique des contributions. Deux optima sont comparés. L'un est défini à 30% de la contribution individuelle, l'autre à 70%. L'équilibre de Nash de ces jeux est toujours obtenu par la non contribution des individus au bien public. Les résultats expérimentaux révèlent que le comportement de « sur-contribution » (par rapport à l'équilibre) ne peut être associé à un problème d'erreur de compréhension mais plutôt à une décision volontaire. De plus le bien public est plus facilement financé lorsque son financement optimal est faible ; même si ce financement demeure inefficient. Les résultats obtenus révèlent des comportements de jeu caractéristiques, qualifiés d'une part de Comportement Réactif, et d'autre part d'Optimum Lover. Ces résultats mettent également en avant un problème de coordination entre les sujets pour atteindre l'optimum social.

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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00178479.

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    Date of creation: Dec 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178479
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00178479/en/
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    1. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
    2. Balder, Erik J., 1996. "On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 133-148, January.
    3. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
    4. Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August.
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