Optimum intérieur et financement efficient d'un bien public :une expérience
This experiment provides results in voluntary contribution for a public goods using a payoff function which defines a Pareto optimum inside the strategic contributions space. Two optima are tested. One is defined at 30% of the subjects' endowment, an the other at 70%. The Nash equilibrium of these games remains the non contribution to the public good. The experiment results show that the over but inefficient contribution is not due to a confusion made by the subjects but is rather due to the subjects' voluntary decision. Next, a public good is easily provided when the optimal point is defined at a low contribution level, even if it is not always fully provided. This last results highlight a coordination problem to reach the social optimum, and identify two behaviors named Reactive Behavior and Optimum Lover.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Working Paper du GATE 2002-16. 2002|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00178479|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
- Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August.
- Balder, Erik J., 1996. "On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 133-148, January.
- R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00178479. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.