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Refounding the company as a social institution:democratizing employee ownership in French SMEs through collective transfers to employees
[Refonder l’entreprise comme une institution sociale : démocratiser l’actionnariat salarié dans les PME françaises à travers la transmission collective aux salariés]

Author

Listed:
  • Arnault Violet

    (AMU - Aix Marseille Université, Académie d'Aix-Marseille, CERGAM - Centre d'Études et de Recherche en Gestion d'Aix-Marseille - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - UTLN - Université de Toulon, AMU IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises (IAE) - Aix-en-Provence - AMU - Aix Marseille Université, AMU ECO - Aix-Marseille Université - Faculté d'économie et de gestion - AMU - Aix Marseille Université)

Abstract

The long-term survival of France's SMEs is a major economic and social challenge. The ageing of business owners, coupled with a decline in the number of company takeovers, threatens many SMEs, weakening the local economic fabric. Employee ownership, through collective transfers to employees, appears to be a relevant solution, enabling employees to buy out their company together. Despite its potential, collective transfers to employees are struggling to develop in French SMEs. Specific schemes such as the FCPE de reprise or the SCOP d'amorçage exist, but their implementation has often ended in failure, in contrast to international models such as the ESOP plan in the United States. This raises the question of the obstacles and levers to the development of employee ownership in French SMEs, as part of a collective transfer to employees. To answer this question, our research is based on an exploratory qualitative study of interviews with experts. This article highlights the obstacles and levers influencing the development of collective transfers of SMEs to employees, both in terms of existing schemes in France, such as the FCPE de reprise and the SCOP d'amorçage, and in terms of more structural dynamics on a national scale. Lastly, it suggests possible reforms to enhance the effectiveness and spread of the FCPE de reprise, with a view to conceiving the company as a social institution.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnault Violet, 2025. "Refounding the company as a social institution:democratizing employee ownership in French SMEs through collective transfers to employees [Refonder l’entreprise comme une institution sociale : démoc," Post-Print hal-05292818, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05292818
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05292818v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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