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Meritocracy or malfeasance: violations of meritocracy erode civic rule following

Author

Listed:
  • Reuben Kline

    (SBU - Stony Brook University [SUNY] - SUNY - State University of New York)

  • Fabio Galeotti

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Raimondello Orsini

    (UNIBO - Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna = University of Bologna)

Abstract

The perceived legitimacy of institutions, along with the voluntary compliance with authority that it undergirds, is crucial for stable governance and economic development. Legitimacy varies greatly across individuals and societies. We introduce a simple model of meritocratic equity—the notion that in a social exchange, individuals should receive greater compensation if their contributions exceed those of others. We argue that violations of meritocratic equity undermine the legitimacy of authority, leading to breaking rules, laws and civic norms—behaviors we refer to as justified malfeasance—in an effort to reduce perceived inequity. Using data from an incentivized laboratory experiment conducted in the United States and Italy and complemented by data from the World Values Survey, we investigate the effect of meritocratic violations on malfeasance. We find convergent evidence that meritocratic inequity explains variation in justified malfeasance across individuals and across countries. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for multiple equilibria in societal levels of malfeasance and voluntary compliance with authority.

Suggested Citation

  • Reuben Kline & Fabio Galeotti & Raimondello Orsini, 2025. "Meritocracy or malfeasance: violations of meritocracy erode civic rule following," Post-Print hal-05167211, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05167211
    DOI: 10.3389/frbhe.2025.1492421
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05167211v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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