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Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision

Author

Listed:
  • Philipp Geiler

    (Towers Watson, EM - EMLyon Business School)

  • Luc Renneboog

    (Tilburg University [Tilburg] - Netspar)

Abstract

We analyze the payout channel choice of listed UK firms and examine whether the choice between dividends, share repurchases, a combination of payout channels, or complete earnings retention is affected by investor sentiment, taxation, major shareholder ownership, and in particular the CEO's compensation package. The payout choice can have an immediate effect on the value of the CEO's stock options and restricted stock, whereby anticipated dividends drive down the value of her equity-based pay if it is not dividend-protected whereas share repurchases may have a positive impact. We use a quantile regression analysis to examine various payout scenarios as well as a nested logit model which studies payout choice conditional on changing payout levels. We find that it is the CEO's personal wealth as reflected by her compensation package rather than shareholder preferences which has the strongest impact on the firm's payout policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, 2016. "Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision," Post-Print hal-02313314, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313314
    DOI: 10.1111/corg.12127
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Artem E. Anilov & Irina V. Ivashkovskaya, 2020. "Do boards of directors affect CEO behavior? Evidence from payout decisions," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(4), pages 989-1017, December.
    2. Lu, Yun & Ntim, Collins G. & Zhang, Qingjing & Li, Pingli, 2022. "Board of directors’ attributes and corporate outcomes: A systematic literature review and future research agenda," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    3. Birhanu, Addis Gedefaw & Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Acquisition experience and director remuneration," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    4. Mao, Yaping & Renneboog, Luc, 2015. "Do managers manipulate earnings prior to management buyouts?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 43-61.
    5. Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc, 2015. "Taxes, earnings payout, and payout channel choice," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 178-203.
    6. Patricia Kotnik & Mustafa Erdem Sakinc & Dejan Guduras, 2018. "Executive compensation in Europe: Realized gains from stock-based pay," Working Papers Series 78, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    7. Trinh, Vu Quang & Seetaram, Neelu, 2022. "Top-management compensation and survival likelihood: the case of tourism and leisure firms in the US," Annals of Tourism Research, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    8. Driver, Ciaran & Grosman, Anna & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2020. "Dividend policy and investor pressure," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 559-576.
    9. Kai Xu & Michael A. Hitt & Stewart R. Miller, 2020. "The ownership structure contingency in the sequential international entry mode decision process: Family owners and institutional investors in family-dominant versus family-influenced firms," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 51(2), pages 151-171, March.
    10. Anilov, Artem & Ivashkovskaya, Irina, 2025. "How to incentivize CEOs to boost payouts? The role of inside debt," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    11. Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc, 2015. "Are female top managers really paid less?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 345-369.
    12. Grosman, Anna & Amore, Mario Daniele, 2021. "Share Repurchases and Board Independence," MPRA Paper 109811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Smith, Deborah Drummond & Pennathur, Anita K. & Marciniak, Marek R., 2017. "Why do CEOs agree to the discipline of dividends?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 38-48.
    14. Grey, Colette & Flynn, Antoinette & Donnelly, Ray, 2020. "Management compensation contracts and distribution policies in the US technology sector," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. Birhanu, Addis & Geiler, Philipp & Renneboog, Luc & Zhao, Yang, 2021. "Acquisition experience and director remuneration," Other publications TiSEM 6c1d41ae-5e2a-4868-b1af-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Varvara V. Nazarova & Anastasia A. Ivanova, 2022. "Payment to Investors Policy Choice: US Market Research," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 1, pages 89-107, February.
    17. repec:hal:journl:hal-03265164 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Asmar Aliyeva, 2020. "Insider Ownership and Dividend Payout Policy: The Role of Business Cycle," Papers 2008.04069, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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