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A rating-based network selection game in heterogeneous systems


  • Vladimir Fux

    () (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris])

  • Patrick MaillÉ

    () (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris])


During the last years the problem of network selection in wireless heterogeneous systems has attracted a lot of attention. Expecting that next generation mobile devices will allow connections to different types of networks, it is interesting to investigate the outcome of selfish behavior in that context. It may then be necessary to introduce some mechanisms to drive users choices to some desirable directions - quality of service (QoS) optimization, energy consumption minimization, network revenue maximization -. In this paper, we define and investigate a system where users decide which network to connect to based on some ratings of networks, possibly computed from feedback sent by other users. We then apply that model to investigate the pricing decisions made by network owners, in two different settings: a compe- tition among several revenue-oriented operators, or a revenue- maximizing monopoly. The outcomes of those settings are com- pared, in terms of network usage and energy consumption.

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  • Vladimir Fux & Patrick MaillÉ, 2012. "A rating-based network selection game in heterogeneous systems," Post-Print hal-00725032, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725032
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
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    Network selection; Game theory; Congestion control; Quality of service;

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