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Red light game identifies ineffective criminal deterrence

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  • Jonathan Hofer

Abstract

The proceeding investigates the ineffectiveness of law enforcement placement in specific circumstances from the penological framework of rational choice theory. This work employs game theory modeling to determine an individual's propensity to commit a crime. The succeeding illustrates how it is counterproductive to nudge potential criminals where socially preferable behavior corresponds to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous two‐player game. The result of this analysis demonstrates an addendum to contemporary rational choice theory in criminology. The solutions of these stage games show that increasing the placement of criminal deterrents, like surveillance or fines intended to reduce the number of opportunities to commit deviant behavior, is dysfunctional under particular circumstances. This suggests that law enforcement resources should not be directed to enforcing certain crimes. The implications of this work could help optimize department assets and personnel hours.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Hofer, 2024. "Red light game identifies ineffective criminal deterrence," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 83(3), pages 673-682, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:83:y:2024:i:3:p:673-682
    DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12572
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    2. Justin Gallagher & Paul J. Fisher, 2020. "Criminal Deterrence When There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 202-237, August.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
    4. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Navneet Kumar Singh & Nikee Silayach & Rajeev Kumar Ray & Devi Prasad Dash, 2025. "Institutional Effectiveness and Economic Development: A Machine Learning Approach With Empirical Modelling," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(5), pages 713-728, November.

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