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Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource

Author

Listed:
  • Patrick Maillé

    () (RSM - Département Réseaux, Sécurité et Multimédia - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris])

  • Bruno Tuffin

    (DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Marc Vigne

    () (DIONYSOS - Dependability Interoperability and perfOrmance aNalYsiS Of networkS - Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IRISA-D2 - RÉSEAUX, TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION ET SERVICES - IRISA - Institut de Recherche en Informatique et Systèmes Aléatoires - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - ENS Rennes - École normale supérieure - Rennes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - INSA - Institut National des Sciences Appliquées - Télécom Bretagne - CentraleSupélec - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We present a model of competition on prices between two telecommunication service providers sharing an access resource, which can for example be the same WiFi spectrum. We obtain a two-level game corresponding to two time scales of decisions: at the smallest time scale, users play an association game by choosing their provider (or none) depending on price, provider reputation and congestion level, and at the largest time scale, providers compete on prices. We show that the association game always has an equilibrium, but that several can exist. The pricing game is then solved by assuming that providers are risk- averse and try to maximize the minimal revenue they can get at a user equilibrium. We illustrate what can be the outcome of this game and that there are situations for which providers can co-exist.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Maillé & Bruno Tuffin & Jean-Marc Vigne, 2012. "Competition between wireless service providers sharing a radio resource," Post-Print hal-00725181, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00725181
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-30054-7_28
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725181
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    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00725181/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patrick MaillÉ & Bruno Tuffin, 2011. "Competition among providers in loss networks," Post-Print hal-00724665, HAL.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Shared spectrum; Pricing; Game theory; Wireless networks;

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