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Financial incentives and pesticide use

Author

Listed:
  • Katti Millock

    (ARE - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California)

  • David Zilberman

    (ARE - Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics [Berkeley] - UC Berkeley - University of California [Berkeley] - UC - University of California)

Abstract

This paper argues that the current pesticide regulatory system is inefficient. An elaborate set of registration requirements has led to high costs of new pesticides. The current system does not provide any incentives for decreasing its pesticide use. The implementation of financial incentives to control pesticide use is difficult since damage from pesticide use depends on locational factors, timing, and manner of application. An efficient pesticide tax scheme requires detailed monitoring and reporting of pesticide use by farmers. Improved monitoring systems will enable differentiated pesticide taxes according to application technology, and such differentiated taxation will encourage the adoption of precision technologies that reduce pesticide use. Proceeds from pesticide taxes may have a role in financing research and education in Integrated Pest Management methods, given the high development costs and advanced management skills demanded by many non-chemical control methods. The transition to efficient financial incentives will be gradual in the near future, and it may be useful to use financial incentives to induce improvement in pesticide use efficiency and reduce pesticides use levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Katti Millock & David Zilberman, 1997. "Financial incentives and pesticide use," Post-Print hal-00107228, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00107228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. E. Douglas Beach & Gerald A. Carlson, 1993. "A Hedonic Analysis of Herbicides: Do User Safety and Water Quality Matter?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 75(3), pages 612-623.
    2. Fred C. White & Michael E. Wetzstein, 1995. "Market Effects of Cotton Integrated Pest Management," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(3), pages 602-612.
    3. Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo & Sharon Jans, 1995. "Quality-Adjusted Price and Quantity Indices for Pesticides," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(3), pages 645-659.
    4. Buchanan, James M & Tullock, Gordon, 1975. "Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls Versus Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(1), pages 139-147, March.
    5. Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacquet, Florence & Butault, Jean-Pierre & Guichard, Laurence, 2011. "An economic analysis of the possibility of reducing pesticides in French field crops," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1638-1648, July.
    2. Fadhuile, Adelaide & Lemarie, Stephane & Pirotte, Alain, 2011. "Pesticides Uses in Crop Production: What Can We Learn from French Farmers Practices?," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 103654, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Finger, Robert & Möhring, Niklas & Dalhaus, Tobias & Böcker, Thomas, 2017. "Revisiting Pesticide Taxation Schemes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 263-266.
    4. Thomas Böcker & Robert Finger, 2016. "European Pesticide Tax Schemes in Comparison: An Analysis of Experiences and Developments," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-22, April.
    5. Perry, Edward D. & Moschini, GianCarlo, 2020. "Neonicotinoids in U.S. maize: Insecticide substitution effects and environmental risk," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    6. Alfons Weersink & John R. Livernois & Jason F. Shogren & James S. Shortle, 1998. "Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Agriculture," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 309-327, September.
    7. Swinton, Scott M. & Batie, Sandra S. & Schulz, Mary A., 1999. "Fqpa Implementation To Reduce Pesticide Residue Risks: Part Ii: Implementation Alternatives And Strategies," Staff Paper Series 11488, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.
    8. Xiuling Ding & Apurbo Sarkar & Lipeng Li & Hua Li & Qian Lu, 2022. "Effects of Market Incentives and Livelihood Dependence on Farmers’ Multi-Stage Pesticide Application Behavior—A Case Study of Four Provinces in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 19(15), pages 1-19, August.

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