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Optimal Risk Sharing with Optimistic and Pessimistic Decision Makers

Author

Listed:
  • Aloisio Araujo

    () (IMPA - Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada - Instituto Nacional de matematica pura e aplicada, FGV-EPGE - Universidad de Brazil)

  • Jean-Marc Bonnisseau

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Alain Chateauneuf

    () (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)

  • Rodrigo Novinski

    () (Faculdades Ibmec - Faculdades Ibmec)

Abstract

We prove that under mild conditions individually rational Pareto optima will exist even in presence of non-convex preferences. We consider decision makers dealing with a countable flow of payoffs or choosing among financial assets whose outcomes depend on the realization of a countable set of states of the world. Our conditions for the existence of Pareto optima can be interpreted as a requirement of impatience in the first context and of some pessimism or not unrealistic optimism in the second context. A non-existence example is provided when, in the second context, some decision maker is too optimistic. We furthermore show that at an individually rational Pareto optimum at most one strictly optimistic decision maker will avoid ruin at each state or date. Considering a risky context this entails that even is risk averters will share risk in a comonotonic way as usual, at most one classical strong risk lover will avoid ruin at each state or date. Finally some examples illustrate circumstances when a risk averter could take advantage of sharing risk with a risk lover rather than with a risk averter.

Suggested Citation

  • Aloisio Araujo & Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Alain Chateauneuf & Rodrigo Novinski, 2015. "Optimal Risk Sharing with Optimistic and Pessimistic Decision Makers," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01224491, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01224491
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01224491
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alain Chateauneuf & Ghizlane Lakhnati, 2007. "From sure to strong diversification," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(3), pages 511-522, September.
    2. Chateauneuf, Alain & Dana, Rose-Anne & Tallon, Jean-Marc, 2000. "Optimal risk-sharing rules and equilibria with Choquet-expected-utility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 191-214, October.
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    1. repec:eee:jetheo:v:175:y:2018:i:c:p:730-765 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-580 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pareto optimum; optimistic; Risk sharing; optimiste; optimum de Pareto; Partage de risque;

    JEL classification:

    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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