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Myopic Economic Agents



An economic agent is said to be weakly myopic if he prefers a time-contingent consumption plan x bar to a time-contingent consumption plany bar, then he prefers x bar x to y bar augmented by any stationary consumption plan which begins sufficiently far in the future. An economic agent is said to be monotonically myopic if when he prefers a state-contingent consumption plan x bar to a state-contingent consumption plan y bar, then he prefers any sufficiently large finite truncation of y bar. A topology on the space of time (state)-contingent consumption plans is said to be weakly (monotonically) myopic if every complete preference relation which is continuous in this topology is weakly (monotonically) myopic. A characterization of weakly (monotonically) myopic Hausdorff locally convex linear topologies and their dual spaces is given.

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  • Donald J. Brown & Lucinda M. Lewis, 1978. "Myopic Economic Agents," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 481, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:481 Note: CFP 525.

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Dubey, Pradeep & Shubik, Martin, 1977. "A closed economic system with production and exchange modelled as a game of strategy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 253-287, December.
    2. Pradeep Dubey, 1977. "Nash Equilibria of Market Games: I. Existence and Convergence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 475, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Martin Shubik, 1966. "Notes on the Taxonomy of Problems Concerning Public Goods," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 208, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Pradeep Dubey & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1977. "Noncooperative Exchange with a Continuum of Traders," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 447, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. L. S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1967. "Ownership and the Production Function," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 88-111.
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