Myopic Economic Agents
An economic agent is said to be weakly myopic if he prefers a time-contingent consumption plan x bar to a time-contingent consumption plany bar, then he prefers x bar x to y bar augmented by any stationary consumption plan which begins sufficiently far in the future. An economic agent is said to be monotonically myopic if when he prefers a state-contingent consumption plan x bar to a state-contingent consumption plan y bar, then he prefers any sufficiently large finite truncation of y bar. A topology on the space of time (state)-contingent consumption plans is said to be weakly (monotonically) myopic if every complete preference relation which is continuous in this topology is weakly (monotonically) myopic. A characterization of weakly (monotonically) myopic Hausdorff locally convex linear topologies and their dual spaces is given.
|Date of creation:||1978|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Econometrica (March 1981), 49(2): 359-368|
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