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Veto Players Index: A New Measure of Constitution Rigidity


  • Rola Nabil Kabbani

    () (Faculty of Management Technology, The German University in Cairo)


This research tests again the hypothesis of the relation between rigidity and amendment procedures. It tries to assess one more time, whether it holds empirically true that rigidity implies a minor amendment rate whilst flexibility permits a higher amendment rate. Several studies have tested this hypothesis yet there were no conclusive results. This research have developed a new index of constitution rigidity. It is based on the VP approach. This is the first index that included both de jure and de facto variables. De Jure variables are represented in the insti-tutional actors responsible for amendment ratification as stated in national constitutions. De facto variables represented in the partisan actors that might affect the ratification of the amendment. The interaction between these two actors defines the number of veto players. Following Henisz (2000) methodology in developing the index and adapt-ing it to constitution change. Once the index was developed, a regression analysis was run to test the robustness of our new index as a determinant for constitution rigidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Rola Nabil Kabbani, 2016. "Veto Players Index: A New Measure of Constitution Rigidity," Working Papers 40, The German University in Cairo, Faculty of Management Technology.
  • Handle: RePEc:guc:wpaper:40

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
    2. Voigt, Stefan, 1997. "Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
    3. repec:cup:apsrev:v:97:y:2003:i:03:p:407-423_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 289-325, July.
    5. Ugo Panizza, 2001. "Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 311-342, November.
    6. Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, 2009. "The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 213-240, Spring.
    7. W. J. Henisz, 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, March.
    8. Andrew Roberts, 2009. "The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 99-117, June.
    9. Kittel, Bernhard & Obinger, Herbert, 2002. "Political parties, institutions, and the dynamics of social expenditure in times of austerity," MPIfG Discussion Paper 02/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
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    Constitutional Amendment; Veto Players; Positive Constitution; Constitu-tional Amendment Procedures;

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