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Globalization and Protectionism: AMLO’s 2006 Presidential Run

Author

Listed:
  • Sebastian Bustos

    (Center for International Development at Harvard University)

  • Jose Ramon Morales Arilla

    (Center for International Development at Harvard University)

Abstract

We study the effects of local tariff drops for Mexican exports to the US on the local electoral perfor- mance of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) in Mexico’s 2006 presidential election. In an effort to appeal to his rural base, AMLO proposed to unilaterally retain tariff exemptions on imported corn and beans, which were scheduled to drop under NAFTA by the end of 2008. This elevated protectionism in the public agenda during the campaign. We find that local economic gains due to export tariff drops under NAFTA between 1994 and 2001 led to a drop in AMLO’s local vote share gains in 2006. These effects are contingent to the 2006 election, as similar effects on local vote for the left are not found in previous or later elections. Results are robust to controls for local grain growing and Chinese competition. We predict that AMLO would have been elected in 2006 had protectionism not been a salient electoral issue. Our findings suggest export access gains due to globalization undermine local political preferences over national protectionist platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Sebastian Bustos & Jose Ramon Morales Arilla, 2019. "Globalization and Protectionism: AMLO’s 2006 Presidential Run," Growth Lab Working Papers 134, Harvard's Growth Lab.
    • Handle: RePEc:glh:wpfacu:134
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    File URL: https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/files/growthlab/files/2019-03-cid-fellows-wp-111-globalism-protectionism.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NAFTA; AMLO; Globalization; Protectionism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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