Credence goods, experts and risk aversion
The existing literature in expert-customer relationship concludes that when: i) consumers are homogenous, ii) consumers are committed with an an expert once this one made a recommendation, and iii) the type of treatment provided is verifiable, an expert finds optimal to serve efficiently his customers. This work shows that the previous result may not occur when consumers are not risk-neutral. Our result, that holds in a monopoly setting and under Bertrand competition, suggests that risk averse consumers have more likely to be mistreated by experts.
|Date of creation:||2010|
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- Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
- Kai Sülzle & Achim Wambach, 2002.
"Insurance in a Market for Credence Goods,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
677, CESifo Group Munich.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2005.
"Experts vs. discounters: consumer free riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods,"
Economics working papers
2005-09, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Dulleck, Uwe & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2009. "Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 15-23, January.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2007. "Experts vs. Discounters: Consumer Free Riding and Experts Withholding Advice in Markets for Credence Goods," Working Papers 2007-21, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
- Winand Emons, 1994.
"Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts,"
dp9402, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Matthias Sutter, 2011. "The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 526-55, April.
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