Democracy of "Taxation-Redistribution" and Peacetime Budget Deficit
The link between an introduction of the universal suffrage and the growth of government spending has been established in some literature (Meltzer, Richard, 1981, Aidt et al., 2006, Funk and Guthmann, 2006). In this article we try to identify a more detailed mechanism behind that link. So, we addressed to the conflict of interest of bureaucrats, and of the state subsidy beneficiaries. Historically the growth of government spending might be traced to the emergence of mainstream left parties, which openly stood in favor of the nanny state and government help from the cradle to the grave as a priority over the provision of pure public goods. Finally we check the hypothesis that the growth of government care correlates with the chronic illnesses of the modern state finance like budget deficit, state debt and inflation.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:||2013|
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- Konstantin Yanovsky & Sergey Shulgin, 2012.
"Institutions, Democracy And Growth In The Very Long Run,"
0058, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
- Konstantin Yanovskiy & Sergey Shulgin, 2013. "Institutions, democracy and growth in the very long run," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 63(4), pages 493-510, December.
- Konstantin Yanovskiy & Sergey Shulgin, 2013. "Institutions, Democracy And Growth In The Very Long Run," Working Papers 0082, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2013.
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NBER Working Papers
12108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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