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Credit ratings and bank monitoring ability

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard I. Nakamura
  • Kasper Roszbach

Abstract

In this paper, the authors use credit rating data from two Swedish banks to elicit evidence on banks' loan monitoring ability. They test the banks' ability to forecast credit bureau ratings, and vice versa, and show that bank ratings are able to predict future credit bureau ratings. This is evidence that bank credit ratings, consistent with theory, contain valuable private information. However, the authors also find that public ratings have an ability to predict future bank ratings, implying that internal bank ratings do not fully or efficiently incorporate all publicly available information. This suggests that risk analyses by banks or regulators should be based on both internal bank ratings and public ratings. They also document that the credit bureau ratings add information to the bank ratings in predicting bankruptcy and loan default. The methods the authors use represent a new basket of straightforward techniques that enables both financial institutions and regulators to assess the performance of credit ratings systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard I. Nakamura & Kasper Roszbach, 2010. "Credit ratings and bank monitoring ability," Working Papers 10-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:10-21
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Leonard Nakamura, 2014. "Durable Financial Regulation: Monitoring Financial Instruments as a Counterpart to Regulating Financial Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring Wealth and Financial Intermediation and Their Links to the Real Economy, pages 67-88, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Miloš Božovic & Branko Uroševic & Boško Živkovic, 2011. "Credit Rating Agencies and Moral Hazard," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(2), pages 219-227, June.
    3. Marieke Bos & Leonard I. Nakamura, 2014. "Should defaults be forgotten? Evidence from variation in removal of negative consumer credit information," Working Papers 14-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    4. Marieke Bos & Leonard I. Nakamura, 2012. "Should defaults be forgotten? Evidence from legally mandated removal," Working Papers 12-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    5. Jacobson, Tor & Linde, Jesper & Roszbach, Kasper, 2006. "Internal ratings systems, implied credit risk and the consistency of banks' risk classification policies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(7), pages 1899-1926, July.
    6. Nakamura, Leonard I. & Roszbach, Kasper, 2018. "Credit ratings, private information, and bank monitoring ability," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 58-73.
    7. repec:fip:fedpwp:13-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ismail Tijjani Idris & Sabri Nayan, 2016. "The Moderating Role of Loan Monitoring on the Relationship between Macroeconomic Variables and Non-performing Loans in Association of Southeast Asian Nations Countries," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 6(2), pages 402-408.
    9. Augusto Hasman, 2013. "A Critical Review Of Contagion Risk In Banking," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 978-995, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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