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Sovereign debt restructurings and the IMF: implications for future official interventions

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  • Aitor Erce

Abstract

This paper studies the role played by the IMF during sovereign debt restructurings and extracts lessons for future official interventions. To do so, I compare twelve recent debt restructurings. I begin by detailing the main features (?restructuring strategies?) of each episode. I then analyze the involvement of the Fund and relate it to the above-cited strategies. Despite the wide heterogeneity both in restructuring strategies and in the scope of IMF?s involvement, the Fund exerted a substantial influence. This influence came, not only through the provision of official finance and by setting an adjustment path through conditionality, but also by providing independent information and influencing countries? decisions to restructure by providing incentives both to creditors and debtors. My conclusion is that the flexibility that has characterized the role of the IMF so far might have exacerbated uncertainty and induced undesirable strategies from debtors and creditors alike. Thus, the international community could benefit from granting the IMF a more standardized operational role, reducing gambling for resurrection strategies and fostering fairness. Along these lines, I present ideas for reframing the IMF?s engagement in sovereign debt restructurings.

Suggested Citation

  • Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt restructurings and the IMF: implications for future official interventions," Globalization Institute Working Papers 143, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:feddgw:143
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    5. Javier Díaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, 2008. "Recent episodes of sovereign debt restructurings. A case-study approach," Occasional Papers 0804, Banco de España.
    6. Lucio SIMPSON, 2006. "The Role Of The Imf In Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard And Sustainability Concerns," G-24 Discussion Papers 40, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "The International Monetary Fund: 70 Years of Reinvention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 3-28, Winter.
    2. Dvorkin, Maximiliano & Sánchez, Juan M. & Sapriza, Horacio & Yurdagul, Emircan, 2022. "Improving sovereign debt restructurings," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    3. Tamon Asonuma & Mike Xin Li & Saji Thomas & Michael G. Papaioannou & Eriko Togo, 2018. "Sustainability and Equity Challenges to Pension Systems: The Case of Lebanon," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(10), pages 67-106, December.
    4. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    5. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt crises: could an international court minimize them?," Globalization Institute Working Papers 142, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

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