IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/jeurec/v5y2007i2-3p343-351.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Creditors' Losses Versus Debt Relief: Results from a Decade of Sovereign Debt Crises

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Sturzenegger
  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Abstract

This paper computes debt relief and investor losses associated with the major emerging market defaults and debt restructurings of the 1998-2005 period. Investor losses ranged from 13% to 75%, based on comparing the market value of the new debt with the net present value of the old debt evaluated at the sovereign yield immediately following the debt exchange. However, the net present value of debt relief from a country perspective, calculated using estimated country borrowing rates in normal times, was typicallylower. In many cases, countries could have lowered their remaining debt burdens, for given investor losses, by making their debtrestructuring offers more front-loaded. The fact that they did not do so suggests that debtor countries did not expect to enjoy stableaccess to international credit markets even outside the typical exclusion period following a default. (JEL: F34) (c) 2007 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2007. "Creditors' Losses Versus Debt Relief: Results from a Decade of Sovereign Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 343-351, 04-05.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:343-351
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1542-4774/issues
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mengus, E., 2014. "Honoring Sovereign Debt or Bailing Out Domestic Residents: A Theory of Internal Costs of Default," Working papers 480, Banque de France.
    2. Javier Díaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, 2008. "The role of the IMF in recent sovereign debt restructurings: Implications for the policy of lending into arrears," Occasional Papers 0805, Banco de España.
    3. Enderlein, Henrik & Trebesch, Christoph & von Daniels, Laura, 2012. "Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 250-266.
    4. Péter Benczúr & Cosmin L. Ilut, 2016. "Evidence for Relational Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 375-404.
    5. Reinhart, Carmen & Trebesch, Christoph, 2014. "A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief," CEPR Discussion Papers 10195, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Christoph Trebesch & Mitu Gulati, 2013. "The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy [Greek bond buyback boondoggle]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 28(75), pages 513-563.
    7. Graciela Laura Kaminsky & Pablo Vega-García, 2016. "Systemic And Idiosyncratic Sovereign Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 80-114, February.
    8. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    9. Graciela Laura Kaminsky & Pablo Vega-Garcia, 2016. "Systemic and Idiosyncratic Sovereign Debt Crises," Working Papers 2016-27, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    10. Peter Benczur & Cosmin Ilut, 2011. "Evidence for Dynamic Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending," Working Papers 11-06, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    11. Juan J. Cruces & Christoph Trebesch, 2013. "Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 85-117, July.
    12. Ugo Panizza, 2022. "Long-Term Debt Sustainability in Emerging Market Economies: A Counterfactual Analysis," IHEID Working Papers 07-2022, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    13. Rojas, Luis E. & Thaler, Dominik, 2023. "The bright side of the doom loop: banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives," Working Paper Series 2869, European Central Bank.
    14. Mihalache, Gabriel, 2020. "Sovereign default resolution through maturity extension," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    15. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 651-698, September.
    16. Aitor Erce, 2013. "Sovereign debt restructurings and the IMF: implications for future official interventions," Globalization Institute Working Papers 143, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    17. Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2016. "Sovereign Debt Relief and Its Aftermath," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 215-251.
    18. Javier Díaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, 2008. "Recent episodes of sovereign debt restructurings. A case-study approach," Occasional Papers 0804, Banco de España.
    19. Andrade, Sandro C., 2009. "A model of asset pricing under country risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 671-695, June.
    20. Federico Sturzenegger, 2019. "Macri´s Macro: The meandering road to stability and growth," Working Papers 135, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2019.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:5:y:2007:i:2-3:p:343-351. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kelly McDougall (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.