Large shareholders and market discipline in a regulated industry: a clinical study of Mellon Bank
An analysis of the 1987 change in control at Mellon, which was one of only a few banks with a large shareholder. It finds that the large shareholder did not monitor the firm extensively before it experienced performance difficulties, but was able to enforce a management change when problems arose without having to acquire a majority stake.
|Date of creation:||1998|
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