Access pricing and investment in vertical structures with complementary or rival facilities
In this paper we analyze the consequences of access pricing on infrastructure investment and intermodal competition. First, we analyze the optimal access prices to be charged to private operators. We find that the optimal access price to be charged for the use of a particular infrastructure depends on the existence of intermodal substitution or complementarity with other transport modes and infrastructures. Second, we analyze under which circumstances the investment in rail infrastructure is socially desirable both in a context with and without budget constraints. The positive net present value of the investment is not a sufficient condition. The necessary and sufficient condition implies a positive difference in social welfare for the cases in which the new infrastructure is and is not constructed.
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- Eduardo M. R. A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2001.
"Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 993-1020, October.
- Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & Ronald D. Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," NBER Working Papers 6689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 1998. "Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising," Documentos de Trabajo 37, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Ricardo Flores-Fillol & Rafael Moner-Colonques, 2007. "Strategic Formation of Airline Alliances," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 41(3), pages 427-449, September.
- Ginés de Rus & Gustavo Nombela, 2007. "Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable?," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 41(1), pages 3-23, January. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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