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Monetary regimes and statistical regularity: the Classical Gold Standard (1880-1913) through the lenses of Markov models

Author

Listed:
  • Daniela Bragoli

    (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Camilla Ferretti

    (Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)

  • Piero Ganugi

    (Department of Industrial Engineering, Universita degli Studi di Parma)

  • Giancarlo Ianulardo

    (Department of Economics, University of Exeter)

Abstract

We aim at characterizing the Classical Gold Standard period (CGS) in order to verify if it is endowed with statistical regularity. We study the statistical properties of two-state annual transition matrices of countries switching from a sound state to a crisis state focusing on Reinhart and Rogoff 2009 dataset on external debt crises. The CGS period is governed by homogeneity both in time and across statistical units: the Homogeneous Markov Chain Model holds whereas the Mover Stayer Model does not. Our work is linked to the literature on the CGS and credibility (Bordo and Rockoff 1996). We follow a pure statistical approach to highlight two decisive channels of the credibility mechanism. The first is the stabilization of the probability of default of sound countries. The second is the fact that the CGS makes periphery/deficit countries homogeneous to the core with respect to the probability of default. Both channels are decisive because poor developing countries can borrow at favorable conditions and finance a level of investment greater than their capacity of saving.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Bragoli & Camilla Ferretti & Piero Ganugi & Giancarlo Ianulardo, 2013. "Monetary regimes and statistical regularity: the Classical Gold Standard (1880-1913) through the lenses of Markov models," Discussion Papers 1301, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:exe:wpaper:1301
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, 2003. "Sovereign risk, credibility and the gold standard: 1870-1913 versus 1925-31," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 241-275, April.
    2. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    3. Michael Bordo & Michael Edelstein, 1999. "Was Adherence to the Gold Standard a "Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval" During the Interwar Period?," NBER Working Papers 7186, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Christopher M. Meissner, 2007. "Financial Crises, 1880-1913: The Role of Foreign Currency Debt," NBER Chapters, in: The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, pages 139-194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Mitchener, Kris James & Shizume, Masato & Weidenmier, Marc D., 2010. "Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? Lessons from Japan," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 27-56, March.
    6. Bordo, Michael D. & Meissner, Christopher M. & Stuckler, David, 2010. "Foreign currency debt, financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 642-665, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Classical Gold Standard; Credibility; Time Homogeneous Markov Chain; Mover Stayer.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • N10 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General

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