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My bibliography Save this paperThe Influence of Pension Funds on Corporate Governance
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More about this item
Keywords
Pension Funds; Public Goods; Coase Theorem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-PBE-2007-01-28 (Public Economics)
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