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Do investor perceptions of corporate governance initiatives affect firm value: The case of TIAA-CREF

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  • Alexander, John C.
  • Barnhart, Scott W.
  • Rosenstein, Stuart

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  • Alexander, John C. & Barnhart, Scott W. & Rosenstein, Stuart, 2007. "Do investor perceptions of corporate governance initiatives affect firm value: The case of TIAA-CREF," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 198-214, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:47:y:2007:i:2:p:198-214
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    9. Willard T. Carleton & James M. Nelson & Michael S. Weisbach, 1998. "The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1335-1362, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Tsung-Kang, 2016. "Does geography matter in a geographically small and culturally homogeneous country? Firm location and corporate credit risk," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 323-348.
    2. Iskandar REBAI, 2011. "Institutional Investors Heterogeneity And Earnings Management: The R&D Investment Strategy," International Journal of Business Research and Management (IJBRM), Computer Science Journals (CSC Journals), vol. 1(3), pages 122-131, February.
    3. J. Yo-Jud Cheng & Boris Groysberg & Paul Healy & Rajesh Vijayaraghavan, 2021. "Directors’ Perceptions of Board Effectiveness and Internal Operations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(10), pages 6399-6420, October.
    4. Choi, Wonseok & Rabarison, Monika K. & Wang, Bin, 2021. "Independent directors’ dissensions and firm value," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 258-271.
    5. Lin, Chih-Yung & Chen, Yan-Shing & Yen, Ju-Fang, 2014. "On the determinant of bank loan contracts: The roles of borrowers’ ownership and board structures," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(4), pages 500-512.

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