Asymmetric Duopoly in Space - what policies work?
In this paper we study the problem of a city with access to two subcentres selling a differentiated product. The first subcentre has low free flow transport costs but is easily congested (near city centre, access by road). The second one has higher free flow transport costs but is less prone to congestion (ample public transport capacity, parking etc.). Both subcentres need to attract customers and employees by offering prices and wages that are sufficiently attractive to cover their fixed costs. In the absence of any government regulation, there will be an asymmetric duopoly game that can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages offered by the two subcentres. This solution is typically characterised by excessive congestion for the nearby subcentre. We study the welfare effects of a number of stylised policies by setting up a general model and illustrating the model using competition between airports as an example. The first stylised policy is to extend the congested road to subcentre 1. This policy will not necessarily lead to less congestion as more customers will be attracted by the lower transport costs. The second policy option is to add congestion pricing (or parking pricing etc.) for the congested subcentre. This will decrease its profit margin and attract more customers. The third policy is acceptable for politicians: providing a direct subsidy to the remote subcentre, reducing its marginal costs. This policy will again ease the congestion problem for the nearby subcentre but will do this in a very costly way.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven|
Phone: +32-(0)16-32 67 25
Fax: +32-(0)16-32 67 96
Web page: http://feb.kuleuven.be/Economics
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- André De Palma & Fay Dunkerley & Stef Proost, 2005.
"Trip chaining - who wins, who loses?,"
ERSA conference papers
ersa05p496, European Regional Science Association.
- André de Palma & Fay Dunkerley & Stef Proost, 2006. "Trip chaining: who wins who loses?," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0607, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- André De Palma & Fay Dunkerley & Stef Proost, 2008. "Trip chaining: Who wins who loses?," Working Papers hal-00348451, HAL.
- Andre de Palma & Dunkerley Fay, 2006. "Trip Chaining: Who Wins Who Loses?," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0605, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Lambertini, Luca, 1997.
"Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly,"
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 407-420, May.
- Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-79, March.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Vibes, Catherine, 2005.
"Intermodal and Intramodal Competition in Passenger Rail Transport,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Vibes, Catherine, 2005. "Intermodal and Intramodal Competition in Passenger Rail Transport," IDEI Working Papers 345, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Thorsten Fischer & David R. Kamerschen, 2003. "Price-Cost Margins in the US Airline Industry using a Conjectural Variation Approach," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, University of Bath, vol. 37(2), pages 227-259, May.
- Pels, Eric & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 2003. "Access to and competition between airports: a case study for the San Francisco Bay area," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 71-83, January.
- Barrett, Sean D., 2004. "How do the demands for airport services differ between full-service carriers and low-cost carriers?," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 33-39.
- Hansen, Mark M. & Gillen, David & Djafarian-Tehrani, Reza, 2001. "Aviation infrastructure performance and airline cost: a statistical cost estimation approach," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-23, March.
- Eric Pels & Erik Verhoef, 2003.
"The Economics of Airport Congestion Pricing,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
03-083/3, Tinbergen Institute.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0509. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (library EBIB)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.