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Democratic Defenses and Destabilisations

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  • Werner Güth

    ()

  • Hartmut Kliemt
  • Stefan Napel

Abstract

The so-called paradox of democracy is approached as a variant of a more general class of so-called paradoxes of self-amendment. It is studied from a legal philosophy and a game theoretic point of view. Special attention is devoted to the risks and chances of inducing the foes of democracy to accept democratic rules by granting them a share in power. The upshot is that admitting democratic competition there are no foolproof defenses against democratic self-destabilisation.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt & Stefan Napel, 2006. "Democratic Defenses and Destabilisations," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-19, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2006-19
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    File URL: ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2006-19.pdf
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    1. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    2. Charles Rowley & Anne Rathbone, 2004. "Political Economy of Antitrust," Chapters,in: The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 6 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. N. Jayaram & Surendra K. Gupta & A.P. Barnabas & Sachchidananda & P.S. Pachauri & M.L. Khattar & B.N. Sampath & H. R. Khanna, 1985. "India," India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, , vol. 41(1), pages 177-179, January.
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