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Generici vs. Branded: confronto internazionale su prodotti off-patent rimborsati dal SSN

Author

Listed:
  • Laura Magazzini

    () (Department of Economics, University of Verona)

  • Fabio Pammolli

    () (Politecnico di Milano and CERM Foundation - Competitività, Regole, Mercati)

  • Gianluca Papa

    (Assistant Policy Officer, European Commission)

  • Nicola Carmine Salerno

    () (Ufficio parlamentare di bilancio)

Abstract

Il presente lavoro analizza i principali fatti caratterizzanti i comparti dei farmaci generici puri e dei branded off-patent in Italia, attraverso i dati relativi alle compravendite del 2002 (tramite il SSN e per via privata) di tutti i farmaci a base delle 10 molecole a brevetto scaduto che maggiormente concorrono alla spesa a carico del Servizio Sanitario Nazionale. Il comparto dei branded off-patent comprende, ai fini della presente analisi, sia i branded ex titolari di brevetto (gli originator) che i generici-branded, cioè le loro copie di marca diffuse sul mercato dopo la scadenza del brevetto.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Magazzini & Fabio Pammolli & Gianluca Papa & Nicola Carmine Salerno, 2005. "Generici vs. Branded: confronto internazionale su prodotti off-patent rimborsati dal SSN," Working Papers CERM 01-2005, Competitività, Regole, Mercati (CERM).
  • Handle: RePEc:ern:wpaper:01-2005
    as

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    File URL: http://www.cermlab.it/wp-content/uploads/cerm/wp/wpcerm-2005-01.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2005
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hurwitz, Mark A & Caves, Richard E, 1988. "Persuasion or Information? Promotion and the Shares of Brand Name and Generic Pharmaceuticals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages 299-320, October.
    2. Magazzini, Laura & Pammolli, Fabio & Riccaboni, Massimo, 2004. "Dynamic Competition in Pharmaceuticals: Patent Expiry, Generic Penetration, and Industry Structure," MPRA Paper 15968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Hudson, John, 2000. "Generic take-up in the pharmaceutical market following patent expiry: A multi-country study," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 205-221, June.
    4. Andrew Ching, 2000. "Dynamic Equilibrium in the US Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1242, Econometric Society.
    5. Ashiya, Masahiro, 2000. "Weak entrants are welcome," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 975-984, August.
    6. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1999. "Entry, licensing and research joint ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-24, January.
    7. Fabio Pammolli & Laura Magazzini & Luigi Orsenigo, 2002. "The intensity of competition after patent expiry in pharmaceuticals. A cross-country analysis," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 99(1), pages 107-131.
    8. Danzon, Patricia M. & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-195, March.
    9. Mukesh Eswaran, 1994. "Licensees as Entry Barriers," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 27(3), pages 673-688, August.
    10. Grabowski, Henry G & Vernon, John M, 1992. "Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Drug Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 331-350, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    farmaci generici; branded off-patent;

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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