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Target imbalances at record levels: Should we worry?

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  • Gros, Daniel

Abstract

The imbalances within the Eurosystem�s Target 2 payment system are an indication that financial markets are not fully integrated. But the increase in these imbalances in the wake of the large asset purchases (often called QE, for quantitative easing), which started in early 2015, should not be a particular cause for concern. The imbalances had declined until the start of QE, accompanied by a reduction in risk premia. QE was associated with a further reduction in financial stress. There is thus little reason to believe that the increase since 2015 reflects renewed fears about a euro break-up. The �technical� nature of the increasing imbalances in the wake of QE is illustrated by the fact that the European Central Bank (the central institution of the Eurosystem) has also run up a negative Target balance of over �200 billion. No one would argue that this is motivated by a fear of a break-up of the euro area. And there are reasons to believe that the recent run-up in the negative balances of Italy and Spain is due to similarly technical reasons. This contribution does not pretend to make a new contribution to the large literature on the imbalances within the Target 2 payment system of the Eurosystem. Its main purpose is to analyse the reasons for the renewed increase in the �T2� imbalances since the start of the bond purchases in early 2015.

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  • Gros, Daniel, 2017. "Target imbalances at record levels: Should we worry?," CEPS Papers 13209, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:eps:cepswp:13209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2017. "The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198791447.
    2. Gros, Daniel, 2017. "The Single Monetary Policy and Its Decentralised Implementation: An assessment," CEPS Papers 13047, Centre for European Policy Studies.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chmielewski Tomasz & Sławiński Andrzej, 2019. "Lessons from TARGET2 imbalances: The case for the ECB being a lender of last resort," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 5(2), pages 48-63, June.
    2. Joana Sousa Leite & Rita Soares & João Filipe & Nuno Nóbrega, 2020. "Banco de Portugal TARGET balance: evolution and main drivers," Working Papers o202001, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    3. Rosaria Rita Canale & G. Liotti, 2022. "Target2 imbalances and poverty in the eurozone," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(5), pages 1395-1417, November.

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