Iterative branch-and-price for hierarchical multi-criteria kidney exchange
Kidney exchange is an increasing modality for transplanting end stage renal disease patients with an incompatible living donor. Typically, the aim is to find an allocation of donors to patients that is optimal with respect to multiple hierarchical criteria. This paper presents an iterative branch-and-price algorithm for clearing such multi-criteria kidney exchanges with large patient-donor pools. Using a polynomial pricing procedure, the algorithm accomodates not only for cycles of incompatible pairs but also for long chains initiated by unspecified donors. Such chains are increasingly common and important in clinical practice, but, as we show, cannot be efficiently dealt with using existing depth-first pricing procedures. Our algorithm also supports individual rationality constraints required for multi-center coordination. Using Dutch kidney exchange data, we show the effect of long term multi-criteria optimization with our algorithm.
|Date of creation:||17 Dec 2012|
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- Itai Ashlagi & Alvin E. Roth, 2012. "New Challenges in Multihospital Kidney Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 354-59, May.
- Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, Utku & Delmonico, Francis & Saidman, Susan L., 2014. "Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations," MPRA Paper 58246, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ãœnver, M. Utku & SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Roth, Alvin, 2007.
"Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,"
2562809, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
- Saidman, Susan L. & Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, M. Utku & Delmonico, Francis L., 2014. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," MPRA Paper 58247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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