IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ehs/wpaper/13024.html

Price, quality, and organisation: branding in the Japanese silk-reeling industry from the 1880s to the 1900s

Author

Listed:
  • Masaki Nakabayashi

    (University of Tokyo)

Abstract

"Transaction costs depend on the degree of informational asymmetry in trading goods. This environment provides commitment to certain quality with an opportunity to earn quality premium given the degree of asymmetry. A device of commitment to quality could be inspection and branding either by a trader or manufacturer. In the market of raw silk, the largest export of Japan from the late nineteenth century, informational asymmetry between Japan and the Western destinations was serious and Western trading companies dominated quality control by the mid-1880s. Then, Japanese manufacturers internalized inspection and branding processes, earned quality premium, and began rapid growth."

Suggested Citation

  • Masaki Nakabayashi, 2013. "Price, quality, and organisation: branding in the Japanese silk-reeling industry from the 1880s to the 1900s," Working Papers 13024, Economic History Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehs:wpaper:13024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/publishments/dpf/pdf/f-160.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aldrich, Mark & Albelda, Randy, 1980. "Determinants of working women's wages during the progressive era," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 323-341, October.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    3. Federico,Giovanni, 2009. "An Economic History of the Silk Industry, 1830–1930," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521105262.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. NAKABAYASHI, Masaki, 2012. "Price, Quality, and Organization: Branding in the Japanese silk-reeling industry," ISS Discussion Paper Series (series F) f160, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, revised 07 Jan 2013.
    2. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Miguel Espinosa, 2021. "Labor Boundaries and Skills: The Case of Lobbyists," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1586-1607, March.
    4. Sebastian Butschek & Roberto González Amor & Patrick Kampkötter & Dirk Sliwka, 2019. "Paying Gig Workers - Evidence from a Field Experiment," CESifo Working Paper Series 7983, CESifo.
    5. Lin Wang & Feng Pan, 2023. "Incentive Mechanism Analysis of Environmental Governance Using Multitask Principal–Agent Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-17, February.
    6. Susan Feng Lu, 2012. "Multitasking, Information Disclosure, and Product Quality: Evidence from Nursing Homes," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(3), pages 673-705, September.
    7. Massimiliano Mazzanti & Francesco Nicolli & Dario Biolcati Rinaldi, 2012. "Multi-Tasking in the Waste Realm.Theoretical and Empirical Insights on Management and Disposal Performances," EuroEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 5(31), pages 88-101, December.
    8. Eduardo Fernández-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, 2020. "Smart Development Banks," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 395-420, June.
    9. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Working Papers 238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    10. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
    11. McCausland, David & Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2005. "Some are Punished and Some are Rewarded: A Study of the Impact of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction," MPRA Paper 14243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Marguerite Clarke & Meghna Sharma & Pradyumna Bhattacharjee, 2021. "Review of the Evidence on Short-Term Education and Skills Training Programs for Out-of-School Youth with a Focus on the Use of Incentives," World Bank Publications - Reports 35045, The World Bank Group.
    13. Bruno S. Frey & Susanne Neckermann, 2005. "Auszeichnungen: Ein Vernachl�ssigter Anreiz," IEW - Working Papers 254, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    14. Schmid, Andreas, 2007. "Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina," MPRA Paper 23311, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2008.
    15. Pierre Koning & J. Vyrastekova & S. Onderstal, 2006. "Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study," CPB Discussion Paper 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    16. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
    17. Gál, Róbert Iván & Csaba, Iván, 1997. "A bőség zavara: tökéletlen fogyasztói információ és verseny a háziorvosi szolgáltatások piacán [The confusion of plenty: imperfect consumer information and competition on the market of family doctor services]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 673-686.
    18. Mitchell, Austin M. & Yin, Weiwen, 2022. "Political centralization, career incentives, and local economic growth in Edo Japan," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    19. Daniel Ripperger-Suhler, 2024. "Matching with Nonexclusive Contracts," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-39, March.
    20. Bevia Carmen & Corchón Luis C, 2006. "Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-29, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • N35 - Economic History - - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - - - Asia including Middle East
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehs:wpaper:13024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chair Public Engagement Committe (currently David Higgins - Newcastle) (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehsukea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.