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The dynamics of cohort effect in politics

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  • Levy, Gilat
  • Razin, Ronny

Abstract

This paper investigates the dynamic ramifications of cohort effects on politics. We propose a theoretical framework that encompasses a dynamic social-learning model of politics, where cohort effects are endogenously derived from preceding generations’ political decisions. This process underscores the role of political experiences in shaping the beliefs of younger cohorts, which subsequently influence policy decisions as these individuals mature. We demonstrate how these dynamic intergenerational linkages lead to cyclical patterns of polarised and cohesive cohorts. In the proposed model, cohorts emerging during periods of political consensus display less familiarity with optimal policies, resulting, due to random external shocks, in high variance of public opinions. Conversely, cohorts maturing amidst polarisation and political turnover demonstrate greater knowledge about optimal policies, leading to more cohesive public opinions. Notably, our model suggests that transitory shocks can exert persistent influence on politics due to these dynamic linkages. We also present some suggestive evidence, using ANES surveys, showing that different cohorts’ opinions exhibit distinct levels of variance.

Suggested Citation

  • Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2025. "The dynamics of cohort effect in politics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 128073, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:128073
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/128073/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin & Alwyn Young, 2022. "Misspecified Politics and the Recurrence of Populism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(3), pages 928-962, March.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    3. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
    4. Razin, Ronny & Levy, Gilat & Young, Alwyn, 2022. "Misspecified politics and the recurrence of populism," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112544, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Pietro Ortoleva & Erik Snowberg, 2015. "Overconfidence in Political Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 504-535, February.
    6. Kfir Eliaz & Simone Galperti & Ran Spiegler, 2022. "False Narratives and Political Mobilization," Papers 2206.12621, arXiv.org.
    7. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2020. "A Model of Competing Narratives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3786-3816, December.
    8. Malmendier, Ulrike & Nagel, Stefan & Yan, Zhen, 2021. "The making of hawks and doves," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 19-42.
    9. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2025. "Political Social Learning: Short-Term Memory and Cycles of Polarization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(2), pages 635-659, February.
    10. Allison, R. Andrew & Foster, James E., 2004. "Measuring health inequality using qualitative data," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 505-524, May.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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