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A Model of Competing Narratives

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  • Kfir Eliaz
  • Ran Spiegler

Abstract

We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives." Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we represent a narrative by a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. Narratives generate beliefs by interpreting long-run correlations between these variables. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximize a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that people are drawn to hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain, and their contribution to political polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2020. "A Model of Competing Narratives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(12), pages 3786-3816, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:12:p:3786-3816
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191099
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    2. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2016. "Berk–Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1093-1130, May.
    3. Ran Spiegler, 2016. "Bayesian Networks and Boundedly Rational Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(3), pages 1243-1290.
    4. Ignacio Esponda & Demian Pouzo, 2014. "Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models," Papers 1411.1152, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2019.
    5. Roland Benabou & Armin Falk & Jean Tirole, 2018. "Narratives, Imperatives, and Moral Reasoning," Working Papers id:12918, eSocialSciences.
    6. Akerlof, George A & Dickens, William T, 1982. "The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 307-319, June.
    7. Ran Spiegler, 2013. "Placebo Reforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1490-1506, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism

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