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Political economy of tariff unification: the case of Russia

  • Afontsev Serguey


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    When designing a trade policy reform, government of a transition country faces the problem of minimizing both trade distortions and losses in tariff revenues. One possible solution of this problem is tariff unification, which undermines stimuli for tariff evasion and thus saves budget revenues. We use Grossman-Helpman (1994) model of tariff formation extended for the case of asymmetric information to analyze a political economy basis of tariff unification in Russia (2000-2001) and prospects of further tariff unification during the WTO accession process.

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    Paper provided by EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS in its series EERC Working Paper Series with number 04-12e.

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    Date of creation: 05 Oct 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:eer:wpalle:04-12e
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    EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 92/94, Dmytrivska Str., suite 404, Kyiv, 01135 Ukraine

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    1. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521362474, November.
    2. Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 471-500, April.
    3. Abdelhak Senhadji, 1998. "Time-Series Estimation of Structural Import Demand Equations: A Cross-Country Analysis," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(2), pages 236-268, June.
    4. Corbo, Vittorio, 1997. "Trade Reform and Uniform Import Tariffs: The Chilean Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 73-77, May.
    5. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
    6. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1997. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 5942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December.
    8. Sebastian Edwards & Daniel Lederman, 1998. "The Political Economy of Unilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Chile," NBER Working Papers 6510, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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