IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Endogenous Fertility Policy And Unfunded Pensions

  • Alison Booth
  • Facundo Sepulveda

    ()

We study the joint determination of fertility subsidies and Social Security taxes in an overlapping generations model where agents are heterogeneous in endowments. In equilibria where Social Security is valued, old and poor young agents form a coalition that sustains Social Security. When voting for fertility subsidies, the young take into account both the deadweight loss of such subsidies and the gains from a higher future tax base. They also take into account a third effect of increasing population growth: that of a decrease in future Social Security benefits as a consequence of a change in the identity of the future decisive voter.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cbe.anu.edu.au/research/papers/camawpapers/Papers/2007/Booth_Sepulveda_62007.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Cama Admin)


Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University in its series CAMA Working Papers with number 2007-06.

as
in new window

Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2007-06
Contact details of provider: Postal: Crawford Building, Lennox Crossing, Building #132, Canberra ACT 2601
Phone: +61 2 6125 4705
Fax: +61 2 6125 5448
Web page: http://cama.crawford.anu.edu.auEmail:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1997. "The Value of Children and Immigrants in a Pay-As-You-Go Pension System: A Proposal For a Partial Transition to a Funded System," CEPR Discussion Papers 1734, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Panu Poutvaara, 2003. "On the Political Economy of Social Security and Public Education," Public Economics 0303001, EconWPA.
  3. CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER , Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "The political economy of social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1475, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Michele Boldrin & Ana Montes, 2004. "The intergenerational state: education and pensions," Staff Report 336, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  5. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
  6. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Munich Reprints in Economics 938, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," CEPR Discussion Papers 394, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. John Hassler & José V. Rodríguez Mora & Kjetil Storesletten & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2003. "The Survival of the Welfare State," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 87-112, March.
  9. Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 1999. "Positive Arithmetic of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2202, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Alexander Kemnitz, 2000. "Social security, public education, and growth in a representative democracy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 443-462.
  11. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  12. Antonio Rangel, 2003. "Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods: Why Is Social Security Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 813-834, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2007-06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Cama Admin)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.