Property Rights and the Economics of Divorce
With examples drawn from English and Scots law, this paper sets up a simple framework to analyse the role of property and dissolution rights in determining divorce decisions. Although firmly based on the economic analysis of choice and bargaining, the discussion is relatively non-technical and directed at drawing out implications for public policy. In particular the paper emphasises the importance of the laws on alimony and property division after divorce in affecting not only divorce decisions but also the allocation of resources within surviving marriages.
|Date of creation:||16 Oct 1998|
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- Becker, Gary S & Landes, Elisabeth M & Michael, Robert T, 1977. "An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(6), pages 1141-87, December.
- Clark, Simon, 1999.
"Law, Property, and Marital Dissolution,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C41-54, March.
- Smith, Ian, 1997. "Explaining the Growth of Divorce in Great Britain," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 44(5), pages 519-44, November.
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