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GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Begoña García Mariñoso

    (School of Economic and Social Studies. University of East Anglia.)

  • Izabela Jelovac

    (Facultad Económicas. Universidad de Vigo.)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to compare the role of general practitioners in determining access to specialized and hospitalized health care in two different types of health care systems: Systems where a GP referral is compulsory for specialist/hospitalized attention and systems where this referral is only facultative. We model the dependence between the GPs’ diagnosis effort and referral practice, and concentrate on the optimal contracts that induce the best behaviour from the public insurers’ point of view with asymmetric information on both GP's diagnosis effort and diagnosis outcome. We show that the compulsory referral system is superior wherever the GP's incentives matter.

Suggested Citation

  • Begoña García Mariñoso & Izabela Jelovac, 2000. "GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0010, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
  • Handle: RePEc:edg:anecon:0010
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gaynor, Martin, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 211-255, Spring.
    2. repec:bla:joares:v:25:y:1987:i:1:p:68-89 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Izabela Jelovac, 2001. "Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), pages 9-25.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Porteiro, Nicolas, 2005. "Regulation of specialized medical care with public and private provision," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 221-246, March.
    2. Brasseur, Carine, 2001. "Competition between General Practitioners and Specialists in the Primary Health Care Market," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001004, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    health economics; referral; contracts; moral hazard.;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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