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GPs� Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy

  • Bego�a Garc�a Mari�oso

    (School of Economic and Social Studies. University of East Anglia.)

  • Izabela Jelovac

    (Facultad Economicas. Universidad de Vigo.)

The aim of this paper is to compare the role of general practitioners in determining access to specialised and hospitalised health care in two different types of health care systems: Systems where a GP referral is compulsory for specialist/hospitalised attention and systems where this referral is only facultative. We model the dependence between the GPs� diagnosis effort and referral practice, and concentrate on the optimal contracts that induce the best behaviour from the public insurers� point of view with asymmetric information on both GP's diagnosis effort and diagnosis outcome. We show that the compulsory referral system is superior wherever the GP's incentives matter.

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Paper provided by IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia in its series Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica with number 0010.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Health Economics, July 2003, pages 617-635
Handle: RePEc:edg:anecon:0010
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  1. Martin Gaynor, 1994. "Issues in the Industrial Organization of the Market for Physician Services," NBER Working Papers 4695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Izabela Jelovac, 2001. "Physicians' payment contracts, treatment decisions and diagnosis accuracy," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 10(1), pages 9-25.
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