IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/2001004.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competition between General Practitioners and Specialists in the Primary Health Care Market

Author

Listed:
  • Brasseur, Carine

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Abstract

In this paper, we study the optimal payment system for the primary health care market when general practitioners are not only in competition between themselves but also with specialists. We define the copayment to impose in order to ensure a good allocation of patients among the two types of physicians. Further, we set the physician reimbursement system that guarantees an appropriate referral of patients to specialists. We prove that the GP's remuneration system is more prospective the larger the competition with specialists. Next, we show that the assumption of risk-averse patients precludes the optimal payment system from being a first-best solution. To conclude, we contrast the results of the analysis with systems of gatekeepers where all patients are required to go to a general practitioner before having access to specialized medicine.

Suggested Citation

  • Brasseur, Carine, 2001. "Competition between General Practitioners and Specialists in the Primary Health Care Market," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2001004, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 380-398, Autumn.
    2. Begoña García Mariñoso & Izabela Jelovac, 2000. "GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica 0010, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    health care; competition; gatekeeping; payment system;

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Virginie LEBLANC). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iruclbe.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.