IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ecr/col037/5393.html

Towards development in landlocked economies

Author

Listed:
  • Cárcamo-Díaz, Rodrigo

Abstract

This paper sets out with three objectives. Firstly, it reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between the condition of being a landlocked developing country and the degree of economic development attained, measured by per capita income. Secondly, it contributes to the theoretical literature on the subject by suggesting a new possible reason why landlocked countries may have a low level of development: the greater relative uncertainty to which landlockedness gives rise may have a negative effect on investment incentives in the tradable sector of such countries. Thirdly, it suggests that development policy for landlocked countries should focus on investment in transport infrastructure and on regional integration.

Suggested Citation

  • Cárcamo-Díaz, Rodrigo, 2004. "Towards development in landlocked economies," Macroeconomía del Desarrollo 5393, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col037:5393
    Note: Includes bibliography
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/5393
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. MacKellar, Landis & Woergoetter, Andreas & Woerz, Julia, 2000. "Economic Development Problems of Landlocked Countries," Transition Economics Series 14, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    3. -, 2003. "Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 2003," Balance Preliminar de las Economías de América Latina y el Caribe, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), number 960 edited by Eclac.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Sandy Fréret & Denis Maguain, 2017. "The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1100-1140, December.
    3. Carlo Rosa & Giovanni Verga, 2006. "The Impact of Central Bank Announcements on Asset Prices in Real Time: Testing the Efficiency of the Euribor Futures Market," CEP Discussion Papers dp0764, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Marco Bassetto, 2002. "A Game-Theoretic View of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2167-2195, November.
    5. Arthur Schram & Boris Van Leeuwen & Theo Offerman, 2013. "Superstars Need Social Benefits: An Experiment on Network Formation," Working Papers 1306, Departament Empresa, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, revised Jul 2013.
    6. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Book Review," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(3), pages 535-542, September.
    7. Gaël Raballand, 2003. "Determinants of the Negative Impact of Being Landlocked on Trade: An Empirical Investigation Through the Central Asian Case," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 45(4), pages 520-536, December.
    8. Celik, Gorkem, 2006. "Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 37-44, July.
    9. Régis Chenavaz & Corina Paraschiv & Gabriel Turinici, 2017. "Dynamic Pricing of New Products in Competitive Markets: A Mean-Field Game Approach," Working Papers hal-01592958, HAL.
    10. Christoph Engel, 2006. "The Difficult Reception of Rigorous Descriptive Social Science in the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2006_1, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    11. Boone, J., 2003. "Optimal Competition : A Benchmark for Competition Policy," Discussion Paper 2003-3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    12. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
    13. Horn, Henrik & Tangerås, Thomas, 2016. "Economics and Politics of International Investment Agreements," Working Paper Series 1140, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Matthias Greiff & Fabian Paetzel, 2012. "The Importance of Knowing Your Own Reputation," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201236, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    15. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
    16. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Frontrunners and Laggards: The Strategy of Environmental Regulation under Uncertainty," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 325-346, November.
    17. Ricúpero, Rubens, 2004. "The renewed currency of Raúl Prebisch," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    18. Schweizer, Nikolaus & Szech, Nora, 2015. "A quantitative version of Myerson regularity," Working Paper Series in Economics 76, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    19. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016. "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 115-143, June.
    20. William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, 1995. "Policy Watch: Did Nasdaq Market Makers Implicitly Collude?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 199-208, Summer.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecr:col037:5393. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Biblioteca CEPAL (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eclaccl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.