Rules with Discretion and Local Information
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- Piotr Wajszczyk, 2016. "Informal Institutions in the Corporate Governance System in Russia," Annales. Ethics in Economic Life, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, vol. 19(4), pages 113-121, December.
- repec:eee:jetheo:v:169:y:2017:i:c:p:170-217 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-30 (Microeconomics)
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