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Prohibition of monetary financing: an economic perspective

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  • Wolswijk, Guido

Abstract

This paper analyses the European prohibition of monetary financing from an economic perspective. The prohibition seeks to safeguard central bank independence in setting monetary policy to maintain price stability, and to preserve fiscal discipline, thereby preventing monetary policy from becoming constrained or hindered by fiscal policies. Imposing a prohibition on financing public deficits helps to ensure a clear separation of responsibilities between monetary policy and fiscal policy and is consistent with a range of macroeconomic theories, including monetarism and the fiscal theory of the price level. The current EU-wide ban is more stringent than those in place in Europe before the start of Economic and Monetary Union and also than those prevailing in other major currency areas of the world. Tasked with monitoring compliance with the prohibition among European national central banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) has developed certain standards over time, informed by definitions contained in EU regulations and by cases that have arisen over the years. Over the three decades since its introduction, the prohibition in general has been well respected, although a few actual or potential conflicts with the prohibition have required national central banks to take corrective action. Recent economic crises in Europe have given rise to academic proposals to reinterpret or circumvent the ban, notably during the COVID-19 pandemic. These suggestions have included central banks handing out “helicopter money” to the public and cancelling part of the government debt held by European central banks. In general, these proposals would seem to jeopardise the prohibition of monetary financing and ultimately weaken price stability and sound public finances. JEL Classification: E58, E61, E62, F45, K33

Suggested Citation

  • Wolswijk, Guido, 2026. "Prohibition of monetary financing: an economic perspective," Occasional Paper Series 397, European Central Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbops:2026397
    Note: 339143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • F45 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
    • K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law

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